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THE	  PRESUMPTION	  AGAINST	  	  
EXPENSIVE	  HEALTH	  CARE	  CONSUMPTION	  
Christopher	  T.	  Robertson	  *	  	  
This essay, as part of a symposium in honor of Professor Einer Elhauge, starts 
with his recognition that, for both epistemic and normative reasons, it remains profound-
ly difficult to regulate particular uses of medical technologies on the basis of their cost-
benefit ratios. Nonetheless, this essay argues in favor of a general regulatory presump-
tion against consumption for the most expensive medical technology usages, which drive 
most of aggregate healthcare spending. This essay synthesizes twelve facts about the 
ways in which medical technologies are produced, regulated, studied, and consumed to 
suggest that it is quite unlikely that the most expensive usages of medical technologies 
will have benefits exceeding their costs. These considerations include the contingent re-
lationship between research investments and health outcomes, the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration’s (“FDA”) lack of authority to consider cost-effectiveness, and the preva-
lence of off-label uses that have no proof of efficacy. Where efficacy is shown, there are 
problems in scientific research including publication biases, lack of effective randomiza-
tion and blinding, commercial biases, the use of surrogates for improved health, small 
demonstrated benefits not enjoyed by most consumers, and the lack of power and time to 
detect adverse outcomes. There are also market failures because consumers are unable 
to estimate benefits and have little or no exposure to cost, while their advisors, physi-
cians, have misaligned incentives. Ultimately, aggregate data across time, geography, 
and experimental conditions shows that much medical spending is along the “flat of the 
curve,” not delivering commensurate healthcare value. Thus even without particularized 
rationing decisions, crude regulatory tools that reduce consumption, while preserving 
choice, are likely to promote rather than hinder welfare. 
INTRODUCTION 
“[W]e could today easily spend 100% of our GNP on health care without running 
out of services that would provide some positive health benefit to some patient . . . . 
[T]radeoffs must be made.”1 In a landmark 1994 article, Einer Elhauge took this problem 
head on. He rejected simplistic market mechanisms, acknowledging that, “[a]n individu-
                                                	   *	   Christopher	  Robertson,	  J.D.,	  Ph.D,	  is	  an	  Associate	  Professor	  at	  the	  James	  E.	  Rogers	  College	  of	  Law,	  University	  of	  Arizona,	   and	  wrote	   this	  piece	  will	   visiting	   at	  Harvard	  Law	  School	   and	  affiliated	  with	   the	  Edmond	  J.	  Safra	  Center	  for	  Ethics	  at	  Harvard	  University.	  The	  author	  appreciates	  helpful	  comments	  from	  other	  attendees	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Tulsa	  College	  of	  Law	  symposium,	  those	  from	  Glenn	  Cohen	  and	  the	  participants	  at	  the	  Petrie	  Flom	  Center	  Health	  Law	  Policy	  Workshop,	  and	  those	  from	  Ameet	  Sarpatwari.	  	  	  	   1.	  	   Einer	  Elhauge,	  Allocating	  Health	  Care	  Morally,	  82	  CAL.	  L.	  REV.	  1449,	  1459	  (1994).	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al’s ability to pay should indeed be irrelevant to determining that individual’s access to 
the minimum of adequate care.”2 Elhauge argued that we must make a political decision 
about how much of our social resources to allocate towards health care, but within any 
health plan, there will remain difficult questions of healthcare allocation, ones that “af-
fect profound matters of life, death, and health.”3 Accordingly, Elhauge argues that each 
individual should be allowed to select from a diversity of health insurance plans, each 
reflecting whatever rationing priorities a group of individuals may prefer. Those ration-
ing policies would be applied by technocrats: “professionals who have the range of diag-
nostic expertise to evaluate the healthcare needs of plan enrollees.”4 To avoid gaming of 
these choices, Elhauge suggests theories of consent that would allow policymakers to 
bind individuals to the plans they chose ex ante. 
Twenty years later, the profoundly difficult questions about allocation of 
healthcare remain. However, the envisioned diversity of health plans has not arisen to 
allow self-clustering of beneficiaries around chosen rationing rules. Instead, we find our-
selves muddling along in large insurance pools, provided by governments or employers 
to people who have been exogenously clustered by contingencies of geography and firm 
organization. These public and private insurers have largely punted on the rationing im-
perative, and now pay for all sorts of high-cost treatments with little or no proven effica-
cy, and without any serious concern for cost-effectiveness as such.5 In America, market 
forces, along with policymakers and courts, still reject the notion that insurers, physi-
cians, or the government should ration on our behalf.6 
In a 1996 article, Elhauge presciently diagnosed this difficulty of breaking the 
healthcare system out of this “absolutist imperative that encourages the provision of all 
medical care having positive net health benefits regardless of cost.”7 Elhauge worried 
                                                	   2.	  	   Id.	  at	  1455.	  	   3.	  	   Id.	  at	  1453.	  	   4.	  	   Id.	  	   5.	  	   See	  Christopher	  T.	  Robertson,	  The	  Split	  Benefit:	  The	  Painless	  Way	   to	  Put	  Skin	  Back	   in	   the	  Health	  
Care	  Game,	  98	  CORNELL	  L.	  REV.	  921,	  935-­‐939	   (2013).	  See	  also	   James	  D.	  Chambers,	  Peter	   J.	  Neumann,	  &	  Martin	   J.	   Buxton,	   Does	   Medicare	   Have	   an	   Implicit	   Cost-­‐Effectiveness	   Threshold?	   30	   MEDICAL	   DECISION	  MAKING	  E14	   (July-­‐Aug	  2010)	   (concluding	   that	   “CMS	   is	   covering	   a	   number	   of	   interventions	   that	   do	  not	  appear	   to	   be	   cost	   effective,”	   and	   do	   not	   appear	   to	   be	   using	   a	   cost-­‐effectiveness	   threshold).	   There	   are	  noteworthy	  anecdotes	  and	  exceptions	   to	   this	  rule.	  See	  e.g.,	  E.	  Ray	  Dorsey	  &	  David	  O.	  Meltzer,	  The	  Eco-­‐
nomics	  of	  Comparative	  Effectiveness	  Research,	  75	  NEUROLOGY	  492,	  493	  (2010):	  In	  the	  1990s,	  the	  then	  Agency	  for	  Health	  Care	  Policy	  and	  Research	  funded	  a	  study	  of	  the	  management	  of	  back	  pain	  and	  found	  that	  much	  back	  surgery	  was	  unnecessary.	  The	  response	  was	  not	  a	  move	  to	  less	  expensive	  (and	  more	  effective)	  treatment	  op-­‐tions	  but	  rather	   intense	   lobbying	  by	  vested	   interests	  and	  ultimately,	  a	  move	  to	  re-­‐duce	  funding	  for	  the	  Agency.	  	  
See	   also	   Stephen	   S.	   Hall,	   The	   Cost	   of	   Living,	   N.Y.	   MAGAZINE,	   (Oct.	   21,	   2013),	  nymag.com/news/features/cancer-­‐drugs-­‐2013-­‐10/#print	  (describing	  how	  the	  formulary	  committee	  for	  Sloan-­‐Kettering	  hospital	   recently	  decided,	   for	   the	   first	   time	  ever,	   not	   to	  provide	   a	  drug,	   because	  of	   its	  price).	  	   6.	  	   See	   William	   M.	   Sage,	   Should	   the	   Patient	   Conquer?,	   45	  WAKE	   FOREST	   L.	   REV.	   1505,	   1510	   (2010)	  (“[W]e	  regard	  health	  insurance	  as	  a	  life	  raft	  for	  those	  in	  peril	  instead	  of	  a	  common-­‐pool	  resource	  requir-­‐ing	  stewardship.	  We	  reach	  desperately	   for	  any	  new	  technology	   that	  might	  help	  defeat	  death.	  Any	  pre-­‐planned	  limit	  seems	  like	  a	  death	  panel.”);	  DAVID	  MECHANIC,	  FROM	  ADVOCACY	  TO	  ALLOCATION:	  THE	  EVOLVING	  AMERICAN	   HEALTH	   CARE	   SYSTEM	   215	   (1986)	   (It	   is	   “highly	   unlikely	   that	   the	   American	   population	  would	  support	   the	   rationing	   of	   expensive	   high	   technology	   in	   the	   fashion	   characterizing	   England’s	   National	  Health	  Service.”).	  	   7.	  	   Einer	  Elhauge,	  The	  Limited	  Regulatory	  Potential	  of	  Medical	  Technology	  Assessment,	  82	  VA.	  L.	  REV.	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that this form of healthcare financing incentivizes the production of “innovations that 
marginally improve medical outcomes despite great cost.”8 Although policymakers could 
try to screen these low-value technologies from reaching the market, Elhauge wisely 
“doubt[ed]” that “regulation can do much about the cost escalation problem. The tech-
nology we get reflects the incentive structure for using it.”9 Elhauge explained that the 
task of regulating particular medical technologies—to distinguish between the worth-
while and the wasteful—foundered on normative and epistemic problems.  
Epistemically, regulators often lack the rigorous scientific information that would 
be necessary to quantify the causal benefits of medical technologies. Elhauge explains 
that such regulators “face enormous technical problems” as the costs and benefits “vary 
with output and regions, among individuals and across time. No centralized regulator 
could possibly implement regulations that effectively adjust for all these factors and shift 
quickly with time and region as the factors change.”10  
Normatively, even assuming a regulator could reliably identify the marginal bene-
fits of a medical technology in a particular use, she still must assess whether the health 
benefits are worth the price. That task requires her to put a dollar value on an extra few 
days of life, or on sight versus blindness. Although routinely done in other countries, 
these questions require “value judgments that are not susceptible to objective scientific 
determination.”11 
For example, consider the thirteen new cancer drugs approved in 2012. Twelve of 
them “were priced above $100,000 annually.”12 When used for the FDA-approved condi-
tion, only one of these drugs “provides survival gains that last more than 2 months,” 
when tested in the carefully-constructed clinical trial setting.13 Scholars have thus esti-
mated that these drugs cost about $33,500 for each additional month lived.14 Even with 
these facts stipulated, and the sense of aghast that many infect some readers, it is still dif-
ficult to say that these are such bad tradeoffs that regulators should ban them and insurers 
should refuse to pay for them (binary decisions to allow or disallow the technology).15 
But even worse, when these new drugs are used off-label, as is frequently common in the 
                                                                                                                    1525,	  1526	  (1996).	  	   8.	  	   Id.	  	   9.	  	   Id.	  	   10.	  	   Id.	  at	  1530.	  Similarly,	  see	  Adam	  G.	  Elshaug,	  J.	  Michael	  McWilliams,	  &	  Bruce	  E.	  Landon,	  The	  Value	  of	  
Low-­‐Value	  Lists,	  309	  J.	  AM.	  MED.	  ASS’N	  775,	  775	  (2013)	  (discussing	  patient	  heterogeneity	  as	  an	  obstacle	  to	  cost-­‐benefit	  evaluation).	  	  	   11.	  	   Elhauge,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  1529.	  	   12.	  	   Donald	  W.	   Light	   &	  Hagop	   Kantarjian,	  Market	   Spiral	   Pricing	   of	   Cancer	   Drugs,	   119	   CANCER	   3900,	  3900	  (2013).	  	   13.	  	   Id.	  	   14.	  	   Camille	  Abboud	  et	  al.,	  The	  Price	  of	  Drugs	  for	  Chronic	  Myeloid	  Leukemia	  (CML)	  is	  a	  Reflection	  of	  the	  
Unsustainable	  Prices	  of	  Cancer	  Drugs:	  From	  the	  Perspective	  of	  a	  Large	  Group	  of	  CML	  Experts,	  BLOOD	  (Apr.	  25,	   2013),	   http://bloodjournal.hematologylibrary.org/content/early/2013/04/23/blood-­‐2013-­‐03-­‐490003.full.pdf	  (“[f]or	  example,	  in	  pancreatic	  cancer,	  where	  the	  median	  survival	  is	  6	  months,	  a	  new	  drug	  that	  may	   prolong	   survival	   by	   2	  months,	   and	   is	   priced	   at	   $100,000	   per	   year,	  will	   cost	   $67,000	   over	   8	  months	   survived,	   or	   $33,500	   per	   additional	   month	   lived,	   equivalent	   to	   $400,000	   per	   additional	   year	  lived.”).	  	  	  	  15.	  See	  generally	  Nancy	  Devlin	  &	  David	  Parkin,	  Does	  NICE	  Have	  a	  Cost-­‐Effectiveness	  Threshold	  and	  What	  
other	  Factors	   Influence	   its	  Decisions?	  A	  Binary	  Choice	  Analysis,	  13	  HEALTH	  ECON.	  437	  (2004)	  (discussing	  the	   20,000–30,000	   pound	  per	   quality-­‐adjusted	   life	   year	   (QALY)	   range	   of	   acceptable	   cost-­‐effectiveness	  that	  the	  UK’s	  National	  Institute	  for	  Clinical	  Excellence	  uses	  for	  its	  “binary”	  coverage	  decisions).	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oncology sector, the tradeoff will be even more uncertain, since the benefits are un-
known. 
Sophisticated economic methods continue to be refined in hopes of somehow 
bridging the normative-empirical divide, at least when the tangible health benefits can be 
identified.16 However, it remains to be seen whether such methods could ever have the 
reliability, validity, and perceived legitimacy to justify such binary forms of rationing 
regulation. 
GENERALIZED REGULATORY PRESUMPTIONS AS A WAY FORWARD 
Instead of trying to ration particular uses of particular technologies for particular 
patients, regulators and insurers may turn to other mechanisms that work more generally 
to reduce consumption. For example, policymakers may seek to regulate the ways that 
the pharmaceutical and medical device industries interact with physicians, proscribing 
certain sales pitches or economic relationships that drive consumption of medical tech-
nologies.17 Or, policymakers may modify insurance reimbursements in ways that give 
providers or patients incentives to decline certain medical technologies that they other-
wise might consume. In other work, I have suggested novel mechanisms for doing so.18 
To the extent that these sorts of policy interventions preserve patients’ access to 
and choices about medical technologies, these policy levers may be more feasible in the 
market and politics than binary rationing policies. The aversion to binary rationing may, 
moreover, reflect bona fide individual preferences. Individuals may rationally prefer to 
have access to medical technologies, which they in fact later decline to actually consume. 
This is the option-value of health insurance. 
While these sorts of policies may work to reduce wasteful consumption, they are 
admittedly crude and are not tailored to individual patients consuming particular treat-
ments for particular purposes (since we lack the normative and epistemic basis for nar-
rower tailoring). The policies will thus reduce consumption of some high-value medical 
technologies, along with the low-value uses being targeted. Accordingly, there are pater-
nalist concerns that such policies harm the welfare of individual patients.19 Similarly, 
there are utilitarian concerns that such reforms may actually setback aggregate social 
welfare.20 The problem with these paternalist and welfarist critiques is the same one that 
                                                	   16.	  	   See	  e.g.,	  Emma	  McIntosh,	  Cam	  Donaldson	  &	  Mandy	  Ryan,	  Recent	  Advances	  in	  the	  Methods	  of	  Cost-­‐
Benefit	  Analysis	  in	  Healthcare,	  15	  PHARMACOECONOMICS	  357	  (1999)	  (reviewing	  new	  methods	  of	  assessing	  benefits,	  including	  willingness	  to	  pay	  (WTP)	  and	  conjoint	  analysis,	  and	  arguing	  that	  the	  “balance	  sheet”	  approach	  to	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  allows	  alternative	  ways	  of	  assessing	  benefit,	  rather	  than	  simple	  mone-­‐tization).	  	   17.	  	   See	  e.g.,	  Christopher	  T.	  Robertson,	  When	  Truth	  Cannot	  Be	  Presumed:	  The	  Regulation	  of	  Drug	  Pro-­‐
motion	  under	  an	  Expanding	  First	  Amendment,	  94	  B.U.	  L.	  REV.	  551(2014).	  	  	   18.	  	   See	  generally	  Robertson	  supra	  note	  5;	  Christopher	  T.	  Robertson,	  Scaling	  Cost-­‐Sharing	  to	  Wages,	  14	  YALE	   J.	   HEALTH	   POL’Y	   L.	   &	   ETHICS	   (forthcoming	   2014)	   [hereinafter	   “Robertson,	   Scaling	   Cost-­‐Sharing	   to	  
Wages”].	  	   19.	  	   See	  Elhauge,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  1480	  (“paternalism,	  perhaps	  most	  accurately	  explains	  what	  actually	  motivates	  policymakers	  to	  refuse	  to	  simply	  redistribute	  cash:	  the	  poor,	  many	  believe,	  would	  irrationally	  spend	  money	  on	  the	  wrong	  things.”);	  see	  also	  Robertson,	  supra	  note	  17	  (discussing	  judicial	  concerns	  that	  restrictions	  on	  off-­‐label	  marketing	  will	  be	  deleterious	  to	  patients).	  	   20.	  	   See	  e.g.,	  Joseph	  P.	  Newhouse,	  Medical	  Care	  Costs:	  How	  Much	  Welfare	  Loss?,	  6	  J.	  ECON.	  PERSPECTIVES	  3,	  3	  (1992)	  (“some	  proposed	  ‘cost	  containment’	  policies	  may	  result	  in	  welfare	  losses	  for	  the	  insured.”).	  
4
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motivates these more generalized policy efforts: we just do not know whether a particu-
lar use of a medical technology will promote or set back individual and aggregate social 
welfare. Such objections can be paralyzing. 
There is a way forward. Sometimes belief in general propositions is more warrant-
ed than belief in particular propositions, and this may be true even when a particular 
proposition is a member of the set of propositions that would be covered by the general 
proposition. Such generalized knowledge may then justify probabilistic knowledge about 
the specific propositions nonetheless. The courts use such a form of reasoning in res ipsa 
loquitor cases, where specific proof of breach is unavailable, but the plaintiff appeals to a 
generalized belief that this sort of accident is unlikely to occur in the absence of negli-
gence.21 When that predicate has been laid, courts then shift the burden to the defendant 
to give more particularized evidence showing non-negligence.22 
For a more generalizable example of such reasoning, suppose that I need to decide 
whether a person named Costa is taller than one named Beneficia. I could invest in a tape 
measure and hire someone to find Costa and Beneficia and then measure each of them. If 
successful, such a procedure would give me a particularized knowledge with confidence 
nearing 100% (barring only fraud and incompetent measurements). But such a measure-
ment procedure may or may not be economically worthwhile, normatively acceptable, or 
practically feasible. Perhaps Beneficia is hiding in distant country and refuses to be 
measured, even if found. How else might I proceed? Suppose I also know that Costa is a 
man and Beneficia is a woman, and have general knowledge that men tend to be taller 
than women. Even without any further information, I could then infer something about 
the pairwise relation, a particular proposition that Costa is taller than Beneficia.23 Of 
course, the amount of variance, the closeness of the medians, and the direction and size 
of any skew, would impact the confidence in the proposition that Costa is taller than 
Beneficia in the distributions. 
Now, suppose that I actually measure Costa and learn that he is in the top 5% of all 
men in terms of height. While that fact tells me nothing about women or about Beneficia 
in particular, it does tell me something about the particular pairwise comparison: the 
likelihood that Costa is taller than Beneficia. That fact increases my confidence that Cos-
ta is taller than Beneficia, since I have reduced (or perhaps even eliminated) the overlap 
between the two remaining distributions (the left-censored distribution of the tallest men 
versus the distribution of all women). With only this knowledge about the underlying 
distributions of men and women, and Costa’s position within the male distribution, I can 
                                                	   21.	  	   See	  e.g.,	  the	  classic	  case	  of	  Byrne	  v.	  Boadle,	  159	  Eng.	  Rep.	  299	  (Exch.	  1863)	  (the	  barrel-­‐flying-­‐out-­‐a-­‐window	  case).	  	  	   22.	  	   Judge	  Posner	  has	  criticized	  reliance	  on	  a	  similar	  form	  of	  statistical	  reasoning,	  when	  the	  proponent	  “does	  not	  show	  that	  it	  was	  infeasible	  for	  him	  to	  obtain	  any	  additional	  evidence”	  that	  could	  provide	  par-­‐ticularized	  proof.	  See	  Howard	  v.	  Wal–Mart	  Stores,	  Inc.,	  160	  F.3d	  358	  (7th	  Cir.	  1998)	  (drawing	  on	  the	  fa-­‐mous	  example	  of	  an	  injury	  caused	  by	  a	  bus	  in	  a	  town	  where	  the	  defendant	  owns	  fifty-­‐one	  percent	  of	  the	  buses).	  	  	   23.	  	   Not	  knowing	  anything	  about	  Costa	  and	  Beneficia	  in	  particular,	  then	  I	  am	  left	  to	  assume	  that	  their	  height	  is	  a	  random	  variable,	  with	  a	  probability	  at	  each	  possible	  height	  given	  by	  the	  known	  distribution	  of	  heights.	  This	  inference	  would	  be	  inductive,	  not	  deductive.	  This	  form	  of	  argument	  is	  known	  as	  the	  “statis-­‐tical	  syllogism,”	  though	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “syllogism”	  may	  be	  controversial,	  since	  it	  may	  suggest	  deduc-­‐tive	  certainty.	  See	  Carl	  G.	  Hempel,	  Inductive	  inconsistencies,	  12	  SYNTHESE	  439	  (1960)	  (discussing	  the	  logi-­‐cal	  properties	  of	  this	  form	  of	  argument).	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make a warranted presumption that Costa is in fact taller than Beneficia, with nearly 
100% confidence. 
One could call this warranted belief “knowledge”, though the term may fail to re-
mind users that knowledge is defeasible. Instead, I call this a “presumption” to empha-
size that I have still lack particularized evidence about Beneficia, and thus to hold open 
the possibility that the belief may be falsified if such evidence were produced. Still, giv-
en that I have near 100% confidence, I might find it unreasonable to invest in finding and 
persuading Beneficia to actually measure her. Instead I might invite anyone who seeks to 
dissuade me to make that investment themselves. In this way, I might allocate a burden 
of persuasion. 
The net value of medical technologies can be analyzed similarly. Rather than com-
paring male heights to female heights, we instead attempt to determine the costs of medi-
cal technologies versus their benefits. For each of these variables, we imagine a distribu-
tion including every potential use of every technology. There are highly beneficial uses 
of technologies and completely useless ones. There are very expensive technologies and 
extremely cheap ones. Of course each particular cost is linked to a particular benefit, tied 
by a particular technology used for a particular patient for a particular purpose (similarly 
you could imagine a height dataset limited to pairs of husbands and wives). The general 
correlation between these points is unknown, but we are aware of very cheap technolo-
gies (e.g., aspirin) that have been shown to have large benefits (e.g., cardioprotection), 
and very expensive technologies (e.g., Avastin) that have been shown to have no benefit 
(e.g., for breast cancer survival).24 
So, to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of any particular technology used for any 
particular patient with a particular disease at a particular point in time, we could invest in 
trying to find its place on each distribution, and then compare them. As it happens, it is 
relatively easy for policymakers to assess the costs of medical technologies, since the 
producers and providers of these medical technologies put prices upon them and the pol-
icymakers pay those bills.25 Of course, beyond the price, there are other important and 
sizeable costs that are more difficult to identify and quantify, such as the side effects of 
taking a drug, and the opportunity cost of taking a new drug versus a standard-of-care 
drug that may have greater efficacy. But actual prices paid provide a readily accessible 
lower bound on the cost of a treatment. 
Like the supposed difficulty of measuring Beneficia’s height, the quantification 
task is profoundly difficult for the benefits of medical technologies, for the reasons El-
hauge identifies.26 Nonetheless, we may be able to make generalized claims about how 
the two distributions are shaped and related, which will allow less confident but still war-
ranted inferences about likely pairwise comparisons, between known costs and likely 
benefits. As such, even while lacking particularized information about benefits of partic-
ular medical technologies used for individual patients for specific treatments, this form 
of inference allows us to assess the likelihood that a policy intervention that attempts to 
                                                	   24.	  	   See	  discussion	  infra	  notes	  53-­‐58	  and	  accompanying	  text.	  	  	   25.	  	   Frustratingly,	  these	  prices	  are	  not	  often	  accessible	  to	  patients.	  See	  Uwe	  E.	  Reinhardt,	  The	  Pricing	  
of	  U.S.	  Hospital	  Services:	  Chaos	  Behind	  a	  Veil	  of	  Secrecy,	  25	  HEALTH	  AFF.	  57,	  58-­‐62	  (2006).	  	   26.	  	   See	  supra	  Part	  I.	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reduce consumption of these most expensive treatments will overall harm individual pa-
tients or setback aggregate social welfare. We can make such inferences even if we know 
absolutely nothing about the benefits of a particular use of a particular medical technolo-
gy. 
Our inferences will be stronger if we limit our comparisons to the tail of one of the 
distributions, as we did by measuring Costa and finding that he was one of the tallest 
men. In this domain it is quite effective for policymakers to target the top 5% of medical 
technologies by price (i.e., the 95th percentile), since healthcare spending is very highly 
concentrated. In a given year, the top 5% of individuals (who spend about $50,000 on 
average on healthcare) account for half of all healthcare spending.27 So, if policymakers 
somehow discouraged consumption of the most expensive medical technologies, they 
could make a sizeable impact on aggregate healthcare spending. 
Using this method, as shown in Figure 1 Panel A, we can make confident infer-
ences that uses of medical technologies in that sector of the top 5% of costliest technolo-
gies are unlikely to have exceeding benefits. Like height for any pair of men and women, 
this Figure supposes a common scale (e.g., dollars) for assessing costs and benefits, but 
there are two distributions because the two amounts may not be correlated for any par-
ticular drug. Still, it must be conceded that we do not know the shape or position of the 
distribution of benefits in the way that we know the distribution of heights for women. 
Thus our conclusions in the domain of costs and benefits will be more tentative, than our 
conclusions about height.  
It is possible that the costs distribution is shifted to the right of the benefits distri-
bution, as shown in Panel A. Alternatively, Panel B concedes, arguendo, that the benefits 
may generally outweigh the costs (depicted by its shift to the right). Even then, Panel B 
shows how the top 5% of most expensive drugs are likely to have costs that are greater 
than the likely benefits. This would be analogous to the claim that a woman who is in the 















                                                	   27.	  	   See	  Steven	  B.	  Cohen	  &	  William	  Yu,	  The	  Concentration	  and	  Persistence	  in	  the	  Level	  of	  Health	  Expend-­‐
itures	  over	  Time:	  Estimates	  for	  the	  U.S.	  Population,	  2008–2009,	  MED.	  EXPENDITURE	  PANEL	  SURV.	  (Jan.	  2012),	  http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_files/publications/st354/stat354.pdf.	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Figure 1—Hypothesized distributions of costs and benefits 
of medical technologies. 
 
 
Note: Any particular use of a product will have a point on each distribution, and 
cost-benefit analysis seeks to compare them. To a policymaker, the cost is often known, 
but particular benefit often unknown, and thus the propensity for being at any point on 
the benefit distribution is averaged. The plot illustrates the unlikelihood that the known 
costs of any one of the top 5% of most expensive technologies will exceed its unknown 
benefits. This presumption holds even if one assumes that benefits generally exceed costs 
(i.e., the right-shift of the benefits distribution shown in Panel B). A greater shift or a 
strong correlation between costs and benefits across products would undermine this pre-
sumption. 
WHY A PRESUMPTION AGAINST CONSUMPTION IS WARRANTED 
Now that the strategy for defending a presumption against consumption has been 
laid bare, it remains incumbent to provide the predicate facts about the cost and benefit 
distributions, which would support the inference that the costs of the most expensive 
medical technologies are likely to exceed their benefits. Let me specify some falsifica-
tion criteria for this generalized probability thesis, which will then become the targets of 
the remainder of this essay. Belief would be unwarranted if, as a matter of fact, the ag-
gregate distribution of the benefits of particular uses of medical technologies were on the 
whole much greater than the aggregate distribution of costs. In this world, the right-shift 
hypothesized in Figure 2, Panel B would be even greater than that shown, thereby reduc-
ing overlap. Similarly, if the benefits were right-skewed or the costs left-skewed (rather 
than the normal distributions shown in both Panels of Figure 2), the presumption against 
consumption would be unwarranted. Finally, if there were a strong correlation between 
costs and benefits for individual uses of medical technologies (so that the most expensive 
ones also tended to have the greatest benefits, so that referring to the top 5% of costs 
would correlate with the top 5% of benefits), then this hypothesis would be falsified.28 
                                                	   28.	  	   There	   is	   some	  evidence	  produced	  by	   the	  pharmaceutical	   industry	   that	  prices	  do	   track	  benefits.	  
See	  Z.	  John	  Lu	  &	  William	  S.	  Comanor,	  Strategic	  Pricing	  of	  New	  Pharmaceuticals,	  80	  REV.	  OF	  ECON.	  &	  STAT.	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Although I have tried to be quite precise about how such generalized arguments 
can generate probabilistic knowledge, the remainder of the essay will draw on various 
sorts of indirect, imprecise, and informal evidence to characterize in a more synthetic 
way the cost and benefit distributions and the relationship between them. Ultimately, I 
need only show that the relationship shown in either of the Panels in Figure 2 is about 
right. There are a dozen reasons to suspect that the falsification criteria are unmet, in-
cluding: the disconnect between research investments and health outcomes, the FDA’s 
lack of authority to consider cost-effectiveness, and the prevalence of off-label uses and 
the lack of supporting evidence therefore. There are also problems in scientific research 
including publication biases, lack of effective randomization and blinding, commercial 
biases, the use of proxies for efficacy, small demonstrated benefits not enjoyed by most 
consumers, and the lack of power to detect adverse outcomes. There are also market fail-
ures because consumers are unable to perceive value and have little or no exposure to 
cost, while their advisors, physicians, have misaligned incentives. Ultimately, aggregate 
data across time, geography, and experimental conditions shows that much medical 
spending is on the “flat of the curve,” not delivering commensurate healthcare value.  
First, let us begin with the most common refrain: “[e]very time there is a public 
debate about drug prices, the pharmaceutical industry replies . . . [that] [t]he cost of 
bringing a new drug to market is enormous—$1.3 billion per drug, according to one of-
ten-cited (but often-contested) academic study.”29 A similar story could be told for other 
expensive medical technologies, such as devices. Prior research has shown that very little 
of industry spending is actually directed towards the discovery of new products, and 
much more is directed to marketing.30 Regardless, one can concede the high costs and 
grant that industry may rationally seek to defray such costs by charging high prices, but 
those concessions say nothing about whether it is rational for anyone to consume the 
product at the demanded price. That question, instead, turns on the likely benefits com-
pared to available alternatives.31 Likewise, an explorer may invest a fortune to find the 
world’s largest emerald, but once the emerald is found, its value will be determined by 
comparing its size and quality to the next best emerald. Its price cannot be justified by 
the sunk costs to find it. The United States government already subsidizes the develop-
ment of medical technologies in many ways; purchasing high-cost low-value products is 
a poor way to provide a subsidy, since it incentivizes the wrong products. Thus, the con-
sumption question must remain focused on the relationship of costs to payers and bene-
fits to patients, at the point of consumption. 
Second, it would be attractive for policymakers to defer to decisions of an expert 
agency, such as the FDA, as a proxy for determining whether consumption of medical 
technologies is worthwhile. Accordingly, one might suppose that the mere fact that an 
                                                                                                                    108	  (1998).	  	   29.	  	   Hall,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  3..	  	   30.	  	   Donald	  W.	  Light	  &	  Joel	  R.	  Lexchin,	  Pharmaceutical	  Research	  and	  Development—What	  Do	  We	  Get	  
for	   All	   That	   Money?	   BMJ,	   at	   2	   (2012),	   www.pharmamyths.net/files/BMJ-­‐Innova_ARTICLE_8-­‐11-­‐12.pdf	  (finding	  that	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry	  spends	  only	  1.3	  percent	  of	  revenues,	  net	  of	  taxpayer	  subsidies,	  to	  discovering	  new	  molecules,	  and	  that	  they	  spend	  nineteen	  times	  more	  than	  that	  on	  promotion).	  	   31.	  	   See	   F.M.	   Scherer,	   The	   Pharmaceutical	   Industry—Prices	   and	   Progress,	   351	  NEW	   ENG.	   J.	  MED.	   927,	  928-­‐29	  (2004)	  (debunking	  this	  “fallacy”	  of	  “sunk	  costs”).	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expensive medical technology has entered the market, garnering the approval of the 
FDA, suggests that its benefits exceed its costs. That supposition would be unfounded. 
Initially, it is worth noting the real possibility that agency capture has corrupted the 
agency’s decisions on the margins, causing it to err on the side of approving drugs that 
may actually have more dangers than benefits.32 Even if the FDA were perfectly func-
tioning, the more fundamental problem is that the FDA statute does not authorize it to 
consider costs at all.33 The FDA requires only that manufacturers prove minimal effec-
tiveness compared to a placebo, which is to say that the product is better than nothing.34 
Even when proven efficacious compared to a placebo, there are often no studies compar-
ing the new medical technologies to cheaper, standard treatments, and thus we cannot 
say whether they have marginal benefits to justify their higher costs.35 And for medical 
devices, the FDA’s scrutiny is even lighter. For example, for seventy-eight “high-risk” 
cardiovascular devices that the FDA approved between 2000 and 2007, less than one 
third had been subjected to a randomized trial, and only 5% had undergone two or more 
blinded randomized studies.36 Once a device has been approved, manufacturers can then 
get FDA approval for newer versions of the device, without data to prove that the new 
design is safe or effective.37 
Even more, the FDA statute also allows physicians to prescribe drugs and devices 
“off-label” for other, unapproved diseases and conditions without any proof or FDA re-
view of efficacy.38 Thus, for many uses of medical technology, there is no FDA review 
                                                	   32.	  	   See	  Donald	  W.	  Light,	   Joel	  Lexchin	  &	  Jonathan	  J.	  Darrow,	  Institutional	  Corruption	  of	  Pharmaceuti-­‐
cals	  and	  the	  Myth	  of	  Safe	  and	  Effective	  Drugs,	  14	   J.	  L.	  MED.	  &	  ETHICS	  590,	  597	  (2013)	  (discussing	  “a	  15-­‐month	   investigation	   by	   the	   Committee	   on	   Government	   Reform	   of	   the	   U.S.	   House	   of	   Representatives	  found	  ‘[a]	  growing	  laxity	  in	  FDA’s	  surveillance	  and	  enforcement	  procedures,	  a	  dangerous	  decline	  in	  regu-­‐latory	  vigilance,	  and	  an	  obvious	  unwillingness	  to	  move	  forward	  even	  on	  claims	  from	  its	  own	  field	  offic-­‐es.’”	  See	   id.	  (quoting	  Henry	  A.	  Waxman,	  Prescription	  for	  Harm:	  The	  Decline	   in	  FDA	  Enforcement	  Activity,	  COMM.	   ON	   OVERSIGHT	   AND	   GOV’T	   REFORM	   (June	   26,	   2006),	   http://oversight-­‐archive.waxman.house.gov/story.asp?ID=1074)).	  	   33.	  	   See	  Peter	  J.	  Neumann	  et	  al.,	  The	  FDA	  and	  Regulation	  of	  Cost-­‐Effectiveness	  Claims,	  15	  HEALTH	  AFFS	  54,	  55-­‐56,	  68	  (1996).	  Still,	   the	  insurers’	  actuaries	  may	  have	  developed	  such	  data	  internally,	  and	  recent	  public	  policy	  initiatives	  should	  expand	  our	  knowledge	  in	  this	  area.	  See	  Recovery	  Act	  Allocates	  $1.1	  Billion	  
for	   Comparative	   Effectiveness	   Research,	   U.S.	   DEP’T	   HEALTH	   &	   HUM.	   SERVS.,	   http://wayback.archive-­‐it.org/3909/20130927160907/http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/programs/os/cerbios.html	   (last	   visited	  Feb.	  28,	  2014).	  	   34.	  	   See	   Jerry	  Avorn,	  FDA	  Standards—Good	  Enough	  for	  Government	  Work?,	  353	  NEW	  ENG.	  J.	  MED.	  969,	  969	  (2005).	  See	  generally	  Riegel	  v.	  Medtronic,	  Inc.,	  552	  U.S.	  312,	  316	  (2008)	  (analyzing	  the	  preemptive	  effect	   of	   the	  U.S.	   Food	   and	  Drug	  Administration	   (“FDA”)	   statute	   for	  medical	   devices);	   United	   States	   v.	  Rutherford,	  442	  U.S.	  544,	  555	  (1979)	  (discussing	  the	  purpose	  and	  function	  of	  the	  FDA	  approval	  process	  and	  upholding	  a	  ban	  on	  the	  sale	  of	  unapproved	  drugs).	  	   35.	  	   See	   generally	   Agency	   Information	  Collection	  Activities;	   Proposed	  Collection;	   Comment	  Request;	  Experimental	  Study	  of	  Comparative	  Direct-­‐to-­‐Consumer	  Advertising,	  76	  Fed.	  Reg.	  38663-­‐01,	  38664	  (July	  1,	  2011)	  (noting	  that	  “few	  head-­‐to-­‐head	  clinical	  trials	  have	  been	  conducted”).	  See	  Nicholas	  S.	  Downing,	  et	  al.,	  Clinical	  Trial	  Evidence	  Supporting	  FDA	  Approval	  of	  Novel	  Therapeutic	  Agents,	  2005-­‐2012,	  311	  J.	  AM.	  MED.	  ASS’N	  368,	  374	  (2014)	  (“comparison	  of	  an	  intervention	  with	  an	  active	  control	  was	  available	  for	  less	  than	  half	  of	  indications.”).	  	   36.	  	   See	  generally	  Sanket	  S.	  Dhruva,	  Lisa	  A.	  Bero	  &	  Rita	  F.	  Redberg,	  Strength	  of	  Study	  Evidence	  Exam-­‐
ined	  by	  the	  FDA	  in	  Premarket	  Approval	  of	  Cardiovascular	  Devices,	  302	  J.	  AM.	  MED.	  ASS’N.	  2679	  (2009).	  	  	  	   37.	  	   See	  Benjamin	  N.	  Rome,	  Daniel	  B.	  Kramer	  &	  Aaron	  S.	  Kesselheim,	  FDA	  Approval	  of	  Cardiac	  Implant-­‐
able	  Electronic	  Devices	  via	  Original	  and	  Supplement	  Premarket	  Approval	  Pathways,	  1979-­‐2012,	  311	  J.	  AM.	  MED.	  ASS’N	  385	  (2014).	  	   38.	  	   See	  21	  U.S.C.	  §	  396	  (2009)	  (“Nothing	  in	  this	  [Act]	  shall	  be	  construed	  to	  limit	  or	  interfere	  with	  the	  authority	  of	  a	  health	  care	  practitioner	  to	  prescribe	  or	  administer	  any	  legally	  marketed	  device	  to	  a	  patient	  for	  any	  condition	  or	  disease	  within	  a	  legitimate	  health	  care	  practitioner-­‐patient	  relationship.”);	  Buckman	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of the efficacy and risks of physician’s intended use. The FDA thus cannot reassure that 
the benefits distribution is far to the right of the costs distribution. 
Third, one might suppose that scientific testing has shown important benefits for 
expensive medical technologies. Yet, many uses of medical technologies are altogether 
lacking in any evidentiary basis. A 2006 study found that twenty-one percent of all pre-
scriptions written in the United States are for off-label uses, and that most of these had 
“little or no scientific support.”39 Off-label, unsupported use is particularly common in 
high-cost domains such as oncology and cardiology. For example, surgeons implant 
more than one million heart stents each year, at a cost of $30,000 to $100,000 each.40 
But, more often than not, these stents are used off-label, in settings where they have not 
been proven at all effective.41 Indeed, a large randomized, controlled trial demonstrated 
that patients who received stents off-label would have fared just as well on a much 
cheaper (and safer) regimen of drugs.42 More broadly, the Congressional Budget Office 
(“CBO”) has concluded that, “[a]lthough estimates vary, some experts believe that less 
than half of all medical care is based on or supported by adequate evidence about its ef-
fectiveness.”43 A recent review of every article published in the New England Journal of 
Medicine for a decade found that when randomized trials were utilized to test the effica-
cy of commonly used medical procedures, they failed more often than passed.44 
Fourth, concededly, there is a domain of healthcare consumption that is supported 
by the peer reviewed scientific literature, and in this domain one might have greater hope 
that the benefits of a medical technology will exceed the costs, since benefits are at least 
proven to exist. Yet, these estimates of efficacy have significant problems.  
Publication bias is rampant. Due to random variation (including sampling error), 
some studies will overestimate the true effects and other studies will underestimate the 
true effects. Confidence intervals and p-values are supposed to help readers differentiate 
between spurious and real effects. But there is a larger selection bias in the known stud-
ies. When a scientific study shows that a medical technology is not effective, the funders 
and authors may decline to submit it for publication. Even if submitted, for studies of 
                                                                                                                    Co.	   v.	   Plaintiffs’	   Legal	   Comm.,	   531	  U.S.	   341,	   350–51	   (2001)	   (discussing	   off-­‐label	   use	   in	   the	   context	   of	  medical	  devices).	  	  	  	   39.	  	   David	  C.	  Radley	  et	  al.,	  Off-­‐Label	  Prescribing	  Among	  Office-­‐Based	  Physicians,	  166	  ARCHIVES	  INTERNAL	  MED.	  1021,	  1021	  (2006).	  	  	   40.	  	   While	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  stent	  can	  vary	  between	  $1,000	  and	  $4,000,	  the	  average	  cost	  of	  a	  stent	  proce-­‐dure	  can	  vary	   from	  $30,000	  to	  $100,000.	  See	  David	  Rosenfeld,	   Is	  American	  Medicine	  Too	  Stent	  Happy?,	  PAC.	  STANDARD	  (Apr.	  17,	  2010),	  http://psmag.com/health/is-­‐american-­‐medicine-­‐too-­‐stent-­‐happy-­‐12861.	  	  	   41.	  	   Htut	  K.	  Win	  et	  al.,	  Clinical	  Outcomes	  and	  Stent	  Thrombosis	  Following	  Off-­‐Label	  Use	  of	  Drug-­‐Eluting	  
Stents,	  297	  J.	  AM.	  MED.	  ASS’N.	  2001,	  2008	  (2007)	  (finding	  that	  of	  the	  3,323	  patients	  enrolled	  in	  the	  study	  who	  had	  received	  stents,	  54.7	  percent	  had	  at	  least	  one	  off-­‐label	  characteristic).	  	   42.	   See	  William	  E.	  Boden	  et	  al.,	  Optimal	  Medical	  Therapy	  with	  or	  without	  PCI	  for	  Stable	  Coronary	  Dis-­‐
ease,	  356	  NEW	  ENG.	  J.	  MED.	  1503,	  1503	  (2007).	  	  	   43.	  	   Cong.	  Budget	  Office,	  Research	  on	  the	  Comparative	  Effectiveness	  of	  Medical	  Treatments:	  Issues	  and	  
Options	  for	  an	  Expanded	  Federal	  Role	  11	  (2007)	  [hereinafter	  Cong.	  Budget	  Office,	  Research	  on	  the	  Com-­‐
parative	   Effectiveness	   of	   Medical	   Treatments],	   available	   at	  http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8891/MainText.3.1.shtml	   (citing	  Leigh	  Anne	  Olsen	  et	  al.,	  Learn-­‐
ing	  What	  Works	  Best:	  The	  Nation’s	  Need	  for	  Evidence	  on	  Comparative	  Effectiveness	  in	  Health	  Care,	  INST.	  OF	  MED.	   OF	   THE	   NAT’L	   ACADS.	   341	   (2011),	   available	   at	  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK64787/pdf/TOC.pdf).	  	   44.	  	   Vinay	   Prasad	   et	   al.,	  A	  Decade	   of	   Reversal:	   An	   Analysis	   of	   146	   Contradicted	  Medical	   Practices,	   88	  MAYO	  CLINIC	  PROCEEDINGS	  790,	  792	  (2013).	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new drugs and devices that are not yet widely used, journal editors tend to prefer studies 
that show significant results. Thus, for a physician or policymaker to evaluate the effica-
cy of a medical technology one must imagine a bell-shaped distribution of scientific re-
sults, from which we only get to see a hand-picked sample of those that purport to show 
the greatest efficacy. This means that published research systematically overestimates 
effect size.45 When publication bias is taken into account, the proven efficacy of medical 
technologies sometimes disappears altogether.46 Unfortunately, these sorts of adjustments 
are not routinely made. 
Fifth, medical efficacy tends to be overestimated for another reason: lack of ran-
dom assignment and either lack of blinding or ineffective blinding, in the underlying 
studies. The gold standard for scientific research is the double-blinded randomized pla-
cebo-controlled study, since it prevents the participants, the treaters, and the raters from 
self-selecting into the treatment arm of the study and from then overestimating the bene-
fits of the treatment. Yet, a huge portion of the scientific literature is based on un-blinded 
non-randomized studies, rather than in randomized placebo-controlled trials. This dy-
namic is especially common for exploring the claimed efficacy of medical devices, 
where it seems infeasible to undertake sham surgeries to implant such devices.47 In a 
2012 study of trials in a variety of disease areas that had both blinded and non-blinded 
outcome assessors, Hróbjartsson and colleagues estimated the size of the bias due to lack 
of blinding, and found a median shift in the odds ratio towards efficacy by about 36 %.48 
Disconcertingly, this shift was larger than the proven effect size for most of the treat-
ments tested. Here again efficacy disappears when bias is properly accounted for. 
Sixth, the biomedical scientific literature also overestimates efficacy because the 
drug and device industry is itself the funder and designers of the vast majority of the sci-
entific trials of its own products.49 This funding mechanism means that the drug and de-
vice industry sets the scientific agenda, de-prioritizing the study of unpatented medical 
technologies and other non-technology interventions, which may deliver greater value. 
Even for the studies the industry does run, Judge Jack Weinstein writes that, “The perva-
sive commercial bias found in today’s research laboratories means studies are often lack-
ing in essential objectivity, with the potential for misinformation, skewed results, or cov-
er-ups.”50 Similarly, an Institute of Medicine report concluded that “[s]everal systematic 
reviews and other studies provide substantial evidence that clinical trials with industry 
ties are more likely to have results that favor industry.”51 It is possible, of course, that 
                                                	   45.	  	   David	  M.	  Lane	  &	  William	  P.	  Dunlap,	  Estimating	  effect	  size:	  Bias	  resulting	  from	  the	  significance	  crite-­‐
rion	  in	  editorial	  decisions,	  31	  BRIT.	  J.	  MATHEMATICAL	  STATISTICAL	  PSYCHOL.	  107	  (1978).	  	   46.	  	   See	  Sue	  Duvaland	  &	  Richard	  Tweedie,	  Trim	  and	  Fill:	  A	  Simple	  Funnel-­‐Plot–Based	  Method	  of	  Testing	  
and	  Adjusting	  for	  Publication	  Bias	  in	  Meta-­‐Analysis,	  56	  BIOMETRICS	  455,	  461	  (2000)	  (showing	  such	  an	  ex-­‐ample	  for	  anti-­‐malaria	  drugs).	  	   47.	  	   See	  Dhruva	  et	  al.,	  supra	  note	  36.	  	   48.	  	   Asbjørn	  Hróbjartsson	  et	  al.,	  Observer	  bias	  in	  randomized	  clinical	  trials	  with	  binary	  outcomes:	  Sys-­‐
tematic	  review	  of	  trials	  with	  both	  blinded	  and	  non-­‐blinded	  assessors,	  333	  BRIT.	  MED.	  J.	  231	  (2012).	  	   49.	  	   See	  generally	  Christopher	  T.	  Robertson,	  The	  Money	  Blind:	  How	  to	  Stop	  Industry	  Bias	  in	  Biomedical	  
Science,	  Without	  Violating	  the	  First	  Amendment,	  37	  AM.	  J.L.	  &	  MED.	  358,	  362	  (2011)	  (reviewing	  this	  litera-­‐ture	  and	  listing	  eighteen	  ways	  in	  which	  industry	  can	  bias	  the	  design,	  conduct,	  and	  reporting	  of	  studies).	  	  	   50.	  	   In	   re	   Zyprexa	  Prods.	   Liab.	   Litig.,	   253	  F.R.D.	  69,	  106	   (E.D.N.Y.	  2008),	   rev’d	   sub	  nom.	  UFCW	  Local	  1776	  v.	  Eli	  Lilly	  &	  Co.,	  620	  F.3d	  121,	  133	  (2d	  Cir.	  2010)	  (reversing	  on	  the	  question	  of	  causation).	  	   51.	  	   Conflict	  of	  Interest	  in	  Medical	  Research,	  Education,	  and	  Practice,	  INST.	  OF	  MED.,	  104	  (Bernard	  Lo	  &	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independently-funded trials actually underestimate the benefits, but it seems more plau-
sible to suppose that industry trials over-estimate the benefits, due to self-interested deci-
sion-making about how to design, conduct, analyze, discuss, and publish the research 
study. 
Seventh, some drugs are “proven effective” only because they promote certain out-
comes that are thought to be surrogates for mortality and morbidity, even if those health 
outcomes cannot be proven directly.52 Thus proof of efficacy may not actually mean 
proof of any real benefit to patients. Avastin, for example, costs $88,000 per treatment,53 
and received accelerated approval for breast cancer in 2008.54 The approval was based on 
two unblinded studies that showed reduced tumor growth but “no evidence of an effect 
on overall survival or improved symptoms.”55 Subsequent double-blinded studies failed 
to replicate the early findings.56 Notwithstanding continued widespread use of the drug 
by oncologists, in 2011, the FDA commissioner revoked Avastin’s approved labeling as 
a treatment for breast cancer, noting that its side effects presented very real dangers to 
patients (including a risk of death) not balanced by a proven health benefit.57 The drug 
continues to be prescribed and reimbursed by public and private insurers. 
Eighth, even after one adjusts for publication bias, unblinding, and industry influ-
ence, and finds proof of efficacy for a real health outcome, it must be understood in rela-
tive terms. Efficacy is only proven on the margin, and those marginal benefits may be 
quite small in the real world.58 Even with an important outcome like survival, the mar-
ginal benefits may be small—measured in terms of weeks or months.59 Indeed, many, or 
even most of those using the medical technology will get no benefit whatsoever.60 Imag-
ine a drug that shifts two-month survival from 10% of patients on placebo to 20% of pa-
tients taking the drug. That doubling of the survival rate would be a sizeable effect, and 
could be expressed as a large odds ratio with statistical significance. However, that out-
come also means that for every ten patients that consume the drug, eight would have died 
regardless, and one would have survived regardless. Only one out of ten received a bene-
fit on the margin; the remaining 90% paid the costs and suffered the side effects, without 
                                                                                                                    Marilyn	  J.	  Field	  eds.,	  2009).	  	   	  	  52.	  	   See	  Downing	  et	  al.,	  supra	  note	  35,	  at	  374	  (“Pivotal	  trials	  using	  surrogate	  end	  points	  as	  their	  primary	  outcome	  formed	  the	  exclusive	  basis	  of	  approval	  for	  91	  indications	  (45.3%).”).	  	   53.	  	   Merrill	  Goozner,	  An	  Extra	  Month	  of	  Life:	  Is	  It	  Really	  Worth	  the	  Cost?,	  FISCAL	  TIMES,	  June	  30,	  2011,	  http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/06/30/An-­‐Extra-­‐Month-­‐of-­‐Life-­‐Is-­‐it-­‐Really-­‐Worth-­‐the-­‐Cost.aspx#page1.	  	   54.	  	   See	  Proposal	  to	  Withdraw	  Approval	  for	  the	  Breast	  Cancer	  Indication	  for	  AVASTIN	  (Bevacizumab),	  Docket	   No.	   FDA-­‐2010-­‐N-­‐0621,	   at	   23	   (Dep’t	   of	   Health	   &	   Human	   Servs.,	   Food	   &	   Drug	   Admin.	   Nov.	   18,	  2011)	  [hereinafter	  Decision	  of	  the	  Commissioner].	  	  	   55.	  	   Id.	   at	   13.	   The	   studies	   submitted	   to	   obtain	   accelerated	   approval	   (the	   E2100	   study	   and	   the	  AVF2119g	  study)	  considered	  tumor	  growth	  to	  constitute	  disease	  progression	  (PFS).	  Id.	  at	  18.	  	  	   56.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  23–25.	  	  	   57.	  	   Id.	  at	  12,	  40.	  	   58.	  	   It	  is	  important	  to	  distinguish	  between	  statistical	  significance	  and	  effect	  size.	  See	   Jonathan	  J.	  Dar-­‐row,	  Crowdsourcing	  Clinical	  Trials,	  98	  MINN.	  LAW	  REV	   (forthcoming	  2014)	   (“The	  absence	  of	   substantial	  efficacy	  for	  newly	  FDA-­‐approved	  drugs	  is	  entirely	  legal	  under	  United	  States	  law,	  which	  requires	  only	  that	  the	  evidence	  of	  efficacy	  be	  substantial.”).	  	  	   59.	  	   See	  Abboud,	  supra	  note	  14	  (discussing	  the	  “minor”	  benefits	  of	  cancer	  drugs).	  	  	   60.	  	   See	  Amitabh	  Chandra	  &	  Jonathan	  Skinner,	  Technology	  Growth	  and	  Expenditure	  Growth	   in	  Health	  
Care,	  50	  J.	  ECON.	  LIT.	  645-­‐80	  (2012)	  (describing	  a	  broad	  swath	  of	  medical	  technologies	  that	  have	  hetero-­‐geneous	  effects	  across	  patients).	  	  
13
Robertson: The Presumption against Expensive Health Care Consumption
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
	   	  
640 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:627 
any benefit. This concept can be expressed by calculating the “number needed to treat” 
(“NNT”) one patient.61 It is quite common for medical technologies to have NNT scores 
above five, which means that less than one out of every five patients will benefit, and 
quite rare to have an NNT less than two, which would mean that most patients receive a 
benefit from consuming the medical technology.62 
Ninth, the most expensive medical technologies are often also the newest ones on 
the market, since they purport to be an advance on older treatments.63 And the newest 
ones are the ones that the FDA, scientists, and physicians know the least about. Clinical 
trials are typically designed with enough statistical power and a long enough period of 
follow-up to detect potential clinical benefits, but are not able to detect rare but severe 
adverse events, like death (which must be considered in any cost-benefit analysis). The 
median “pivotal” clinical trial that the FDA uses to approve a drug has 446 patients tak-
ing the drug for about 14 weeks.64 Jonathan Darrow has thus argued that prescribing of 
newly released drugs is tantamount to human subjects research, without the informed 
consent of the patients.65 It is hard to forget Vioxx (rofecoxib), the pain medicine 
launched that is estimated to have caused the deaths of nearly 28,000 people in the five 
years before it was removed from the market.66 About one in every twenty-five new 
drugs is removed from the market as being simply too dangerous.67 Most of these recalls 
happen within the first few years on the market.68 It is ironic that older, cheaper drugs 
that have survived this gauntlet thus tend to be safer than the newer, expensive drugs, 
whose risk profile is poorly understood. 
Tenth, one must consider whether “[t]he market, in its own way, provides infor-
mation about individual preferences. When people decide to buy or not to buy, or to offer 
for sale or not offer for sale, they indicate what things are worth to them.”69 On this per-
spective—something like the efficient market hypothesis proposed to understand the 
stock market—the consumer is presumed to be making value-enhancing trades between 
money and healthcare. In reality, we know that the market for medical technologies is far 
                                                	   61.	  	   Emmanuel	  Lesaffre,	  Number	  Needed	  to	  Treat,	  3	  ENCYCLOPEDIA	  OF	  STATISTICS	  IN	  BEHAVIORAL	  SCI.	  1448	  (2005)	  (discussing	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  using	  number	  needed	  to	  treat).	  	   62.	  	   See	  Therapy	  NNT	  Reviews,	  THE	  NNT,	  available	  at	  http://www.thennt.com/home-­‐nnt/.	  	   63.	  	   Abboud,	  supra	  note	  14	  (answering	   the	  question	  of	  how	  cancer	  drugs	  are	  priced	  by	  stating	  “[o]f	  the	  many	  complex	  factors	  involved,	  price	  often	  seems	  to	  follow	  a	  simple	  formula:	  start	  with	  the	  price	  for	  the	  most	  recent	  similar	  drug	  on	  the	  market	  and	  price	  the	  new	  one	  within	  10-­‐20%	  of	  that	  price	  (usually	  higher).”).	  See	  also	  Peter	  B.	  Bach,	  Limits	  on	  Medicare's	  Ability	  to	  Control	  Rising	  Spending	  on	  Cancer	  Drugs,	  360	  NEW	  ENG.	  J.	  MED.	  626	  (2009)	  (plotting	  the	  dramatic	  increase	  in	  new	  drug	  prices	  over	  time).	  Further-­‐more,	  within	  the	  market-­‐life	  of	  a	  drug,	  prices	  will	  tend	  to	  go	  down	  as	  substitution	  drugs	  come	  onto	  the	  market	  and	  the	  patent	  expires.	  	  	  	  	   64.	  	   Downing,	  et	  al.,	  supra	  note	  35,	  at	  371.	  	  	   65.	  	   See	  generally	  Darrow,	  supra	  note	  58.	  	   66.	  	   FDA,	  Merck,	   and	  Vioxx:	   Putting	   Patient	   Safety	   First?:	  Hearing	  Before	   the	   S.	   Comm.	   on	   Fin.,	   108th	  Cong.	  14,	  at	  13	  (2004)	  (statement	  of	  David	  J.	  Graham,	  M.D.,	  M.P.H.,	  Associate	  Director	  for	  Science,	  Office	  of	  Drug	  Safety,	  Food	  and	  Drug	  Administration)	  (describing	  the	  28,000	  figure	  as	  “an	  extremely	  conserva-­‐tive	  estimate”).	  	   67.	  	   See	  Zaina	  P.	  Qureshi	  et	  al.,	  Market	  Withdrawal	  of	  New	  Molecular	  Entities	  Approved	   in	   the	  United	  
States	  from	  1980	  to	  2009,	  at	  20	  PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY	  &	  DRUG	  SAFETY	  772,	  775	  (2011)	  (showing	  thirty	  out	  of	  740	  new	  drugs	  withdrawn);	  see	  also	  Amalia	  M.	  Issa	  et	  al.,	  Drug	  Withdrawals	  in	  the	  United	  States:	  A	  
Systematic	  Review	  of	  the	  Evidence	  and	  Analysis	  of	  Trends,	  2	  CURRENT	  DRUG	  SAFETY	  177,	  179	  (2007)	  (similar	  for	  twenty	  drugs	  withdrawn	  between	  1993	  and	  2006).	  	  	   68.	  	   Darrow,	  supra	  note	  58.	  
 69.  Mark	  V.	  Pauly,	  Indemnity	  Insurance	  for	  Health	  Care	  Efficiency,	  24	  ECON.	  &	  BUS.	  BULL.	  53,	  53	  (1971).	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from efficient. Public or private insurance covers most of the consumption choices, 
which creates “moral hazard,” a problem where the decision maker internalizes the bene-
fits but externalizes the costs.70 The largest such insurer, Medicare, is prohibited by law 
from negotiating with the providers of medical technologies, and the “absolutist impera-
tive” to cover all “medically necessary care” prevents insurers from negotiating very 
much.71 Copays do cause patients to consider a small fraction of the costs, which they 
must pay out of pocket. However, copays are largely irrelevant in the domain of the 
highest cost medical technologies, since:  
 
Roughly 77% of full-time employees of medium and large establish-
ments enrolled in non-HMO plans have maximum out-of-pocket limits 
less than US$2000 per individual and the most common coinsurance 
rate is 20% . . . . Thus, individuals with more than US$10,000 in total 
costs will face no cost sharing at the margin.72  
 
As Timothy Jost explains, “[o]nce consumers reach the limits of the deductible, they 
have little reason to limit their consumption of health care or to pay attention to its 
price.”73 
While patients are largely insulated from the costs of medical technologies, they 
are also poor judges of the benefits. In one study of actual patients receiving chemother-
apy for their terminal lung and colorectal cancers, the vast majority of them were under 
the misconception that the chemotherapy could be curative.74 Other studies have shown 
that most consumers overestimate drug efficacy by a factor of ten or more.75 Such ram-
pant inaccuracies may be due to optimism bias, combined with the difficulty of under-
standing highly technical information.76 
Eleventh, one might suppose that the benefits of medical technologies will exceed 
their costs because physicians stand as expert gatekeepers, in a distributed system of reg-
ulation. While one might have reason to hope that physicians do not make such severe 
errors in estimating benefits as patients, it bears emphasis that the scientific basis for 
                                                	   70.	  	   See	  National	  Health	   Expenditures	   By	   Type	  Of	   Service	   And	   Source	  Of	   Funds,	   Ctrs.	   For	  Medicare	  &	  Medicaid	   Servs.,	   CY1960–2011,	   available	   at	   http://www.cms.gov/Research-­‐Statistics-­‐Data-­‐and-­‐Systems/Statistics-­‐Trends-­‐and-­‐Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html	   (showing	   that	   public	   and	  private	  insurers	  pay	  over	  eighty-­‐eight	  percent	  of	  health	  care	  costs).	  	   71.	  	   See	  generally	  Bach,	  supra	  note	  63;	  see	  also	   supra	  notes	  8-­‐16	  and	  accompanying	   text	   (discussing	  the	  absolutist	  imperative).	  	   72.	  	   Michael	  E.	  Chernew	  et	  al.,	  Optimal	  Health	   Insurance:	  The	  Case	  of	  Observable,	   Severe	   Illness,	   19	   J.	  HEALTH	  ECON.	  585,	  588	  (2000).	  	   73.	  	   Timothy	  Stoltzfus	  Jost,	  Our	  Broken	  Health	  Care	  System	  and	  How	  to	  Fix	  It:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Health	  Law	  
and	  Policy,	  41	  WAKE	  FOREST	  L.	  REV.	  537,	  587	  (2006).	  	   74.	  	   Jane	  C.	  Weeks,	  Patients'	  Expectations	  about	  Effects	  of	  Chemotherapy	  for	  Advanced	  Cancer,	  367	  NEW	  ENG.	  J.	  MED.	  1616,	  1619	  (2012).	  	   75.	  	   Lisa	   M.	   Schwartz	   et	   al.,	  Using	   a	   Drug	   Fact	   Box	   to	   Communicate	   Drug	   Benefits	   and	   Harms,	   150	  ANNALS	  OF	  INTERNAL	  MED.	  516,	  524	  (2009).	  	  	   76.	  	   See	   Ken	   Murray,	   Why	   Doctors	   Die	   Differently,	   WALL	   STREET	   J.,	   Feb	   25,	   2012,	   available	   at	  http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203918304577243321242833962	   (discuss-­‐ing	  several	  studies	  showing	  that	  physicians	  have	  different	  preferences	  for	  end	  of	  life	  care	  than	  the	  gen-­‐eral	  public,	  perhaps	  because	  the	  efficacy	  of	  care	  is	  misportrayed	  in	  mass	  media).	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their decisions is severely constrained, as discussed in points #2-#9 above. Further, the 
physicians are largely insulated from costs, and cannot be taken to be making cost-
benefit tradeoffs. If anything, physician decisions are biased towards costly procedures, 
given our fee-for-service healthcare finance system, physician self-referrals, and finan-
cial relationships with industry, which have all been shown to bias professional judg-
ment.77 In high-costs fields like oncology and surgery, the incentives to provide high-
cost care are particularly stark, since the physician who recommends the care will often 
be paid to provide it.78 In fields like cardiology, hematology, oncology, and urology, 
about half of the physicians also take money directly from the drug and device indus-
tries.79 
Twelfth and finally, one might look to the aggregate data about health spending, to 
see whether more of it drives beneficial health outcomes. For this purpose, one can ex-
amine geographic variation across countries and across regions within the United States, 
variations across time, and variations between conditions in experimental research. 
Geographically, the United States spends twenty to thirty percent more per capita 
than countries with excellent health care systems and similarly aging and equally or more 
healthy populations, such as France and Germany.80 As Ezekiel Emanuel writes, “[t]he 
truth is, the United States is not getting 20 or 30 percent better health care or results than 
other countries.”81 Within the United States, from one region to another, there are also 
large disparities in the amount spent on health care, which cannot be explained by demo-
graphic factors and which do not seem to result in improved health.82 Areas with double, 
or even triple, the amount of spending per patient do not show better outcomes as a re-
sult.83 This phenomenon has been called “flat of the curve medicine,” because increases 
in spending do not lead to improved health outcomes.84 
Across several decades, Peter Bach has compiled and plotted the prices of new 
                                                	   77.	  	   See	  Christopher	  T.	  Robertson,	  Susannah	  Rose	  &	  Aaron	  S.	  Kesselheim,	  Effect	  of	  Financial	  Relation-­‐
ships	  on	  the	  Behaviors	  of	  Health	  Care	  Professionals:	  A	  Review	  of	   the	  Evidence,	  40	   J.L.	  MED.	  &	  ETHICS	  452,	  458	  (2012);	  see	  generally	  Sunita	  Sah	  &	  Adriane	  Fugh-­‐Berman,	  Physicians	  under	  the	  Influence:	  Social	  Psy-­‐
chology	  and	  Industry	  Marketing	  Strategies,	  41	  J.L.	  MED.	  &	  ETHICS	  665	  (2013).	  	   78.	  	   See	   generally	   Mireille	   Jacobson	   et	   al.,	   How	   Medicare’s	   Payment	   Cuts	   for	   Cancer	   Chemotherapy	  
Drugs	  Changed	  Patterns	  of	  Treatment,	  29	  HEALTH	  AFFS.	  1391,	  1391	  (2010)	  (assessing	  how	  “substantially	  reduced	  payment	  rates	  for	  chemotherapy	  drugs	  .	  .	  .	  affected	  the	  likelihood	  and	  setting	  of	  chemotherapy	  treatment	   for	  Medicare	  beneficiaries”);	   Jean	  M.	  Mitchell,	  Do	  Financial	   Incentives	  Linked	  to	  Ownership	  of	  
Specialty	  Hospitals	  Affect	  Physicians’	  Practice	  Patterns?,	  46	  MED.	  CARE	  732,	  736	  (2008).	  	   79.	  	   Aaron	  S.	  Kesselheim,	  Christopher	  T.	  Robertson,	  Kent	  Siri,	  Puneet	  Batra	  &	  Jessica	  Franklin,	  Distri-­‐
butions	   of	   Industry	   Payments	   to	   Massachusetts	   Physicians,	   NEW	   ENG.	   J.	   MED.	   (2013),	   available	   at	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2261291.	  	   80.	  	   See	   Ezekiel	   J.	   Emanuel,	   How	   Much	   Does	   Health	   Cost?,	   N.Y.	   TIMES,	   Oct.	   30,	   2011,	  http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E06E7D9143DF933A05753C1A9679D8B63..	  	   81.	  	   Id.	  	   82.	  	   See	  id.	  	   83.	  	   See	   id.;	   but	   see	   Richard	   A.	   Cooper,	   States	   with	   More	   Health	   Care	   Spending	   Have	   Better-­‐Quality	  
Health	  Care:	  Lessons	  about	  Medicare,	  28	  HEALTH	  AFFS.	  w103,	  w112–13	  (2009)	  (noting	   that	  quality	   “de-­‐pends	  on	  total	  health	  care	  spending”	  and	  “relates	  to	  a	  broad	  array	  of	  sociodemographic	  characteristics,”	  and	  that	  “Medicare	  spending	  is	  a	  poor	  proxy	  for	  overall	  health	  care	  spending.”).	  	   84.	  	   See	   e.g.,	   Victor	  R.	   Fuchs,	  More	  Variation	   in	  Use	   of	   Care,	  More	   Flat-­‐of-­‐the-­‐Curve	  Medicine,	  HEALTH	  AFFS.	   (October	   2004),	  http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2004/10/07/hlthaff.var.104.full.pdf+html	   (discussing	  Alain	  Enthoven	  as	  having	  popularized	  the	  term).	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cancer drugs upon their date of market entry, adjusting for inflation.85 In real dollars, 
new drugs are hundreds of times more expensive than new drugs were in the 1980s.86 
More specifically, Deborah Schrag has examined the important changes in the treatments 
available for colorectal cancer that emerged between the early 1990s and 2002. Although 
still failing to cure for the disease, the new drug therapies nearly doubled the median du-
ration of survival, from twelve months to twenty-one months.87 This is a success. How-
ever, Schrag explains that, “[t]he near-doubling of the median survival achieved over the 
past decade has been accompanied by a staggering 340-fold increase in drug costs—just 
for the initial eight weeks of treatment.”88 Without purporting to put a price on those ad-
ditional nine months of survival, one can observe that the growth lines of cost and bene-
fits are not parallel, and thus get a sense that the distribution of overall costs may be 
moving to the right of overall benefits. Likewise, consider aggregate data from Canada in 
a decade when spending on drugs more than doubled.89 A regulatory board appraised the 
value of 1,147 new drugs introduced during that time: “Of these new drugs, 68 (5.9%) 
met the regulatory criterion of being a breakthrough drug (‘the first drug to treat effec-
tively a particular illness or which provides a substantial improvement over existing drug 
products’) . . . . The remaining 1005 new drugs did not provide a ‘substantial improve-
ment over existing drug products.’”90 The authors concluded that “most (80%) of the in-
crease in drug expenditure between 1996 and 2003 was explained by the use of new, pa-
tented drug products that did not offer substantial improvements on less expensive 
alternatives available before 1990.”91 
Field experiments tell a similar story. In the well-known RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment, individuals were randomized into conditions with larger or smaller cost-
sharing obligations. The research found that larger cost-sharing obligations reduced 
health spending, without negatively impacting the health of the median participant.92 
Another randomized experiment assigned a group to receive Medicaid benefits and 
“showed that Medicaid coverage generated no significant improvements in measured 
physical health outcomes in the first 2 years, but it did increase the use of health ser-
vices[.]”93 Although these studies are not focused on the most expensive instances of 
healthcare consumption, they do undermine any conception that more healthcare con-
sumption necessarily yields more health. 
Together these macro-level observations across geography, across time, and in 
                                                	   85.	  	   See	  Bach,	  supra	  note	  63.	  	   86.	  	   See	  id.	  	   87.	  	   Deborah	  Schrag,	  The	  Price	  Tag	  on	  Progress—Chemotherapy	  for	  Colorectal	  Cancer,	  351	  NEW	  ENG.	  J.	  MED.	  317,	  317-­‐19	  (2004).	  	   88.	  	   Id.	  at	  318.	  	   89.	  	   Steven	  G.	  Morgan	  et	  al.,	  “Breakthrough”	  Drugs	  and	  Growth	  in	  Expenditure	  on	  Prescription	  Drugs	  in	  
Canada,	  BMJ	  (July	  22,	  2005),	  www.bmj.com/content/331/7520/815.	  	   90.	  	   Id.	  See	  also	  JERRY	  AVORN,	  POWERFUL	  MEDICINES:	  THE	  BENEFITS,	  RISKS,	  AND	  COSTS	  OF	  PRESCRIPTION	  DRUGS	  198-­‐216	  (2004)	  (describing	  similar	  results	  from	  an	  American	  study).	  	   91.	  	   Morgan	  et	  al.,	  supra	  note	  89.	  	   92.	  	   See	   generally	   JOSEPH	   P.	   NEWHOUSE,	   FREE	   FOR	   ALL?:	   LESSONS	   FROM	   THE	   RAND	   HEALTH	   INSURANCE	  EXPERIMENT	  (1993).	  	   93.	  	   Katherine	   Baicker	   et	   al.,	  The	   Oregon	   Experiment—Effects	   of	  Medicaid	   on	   Clinical	   Outcomes,	  368	  NEW	  ENG.	  J.	  MED.	  1713	  (2013).	  Medicaid	  coverage	  did	  “raise	  rates	  of	  diabetes	  detection	  and	  management,	  lower	  rates	  of	  depression,	  and	  reduce	  financial	  strain.”	  Id.	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field experiments suggest that the cost distribution for medical technologies may actually 
be shifted to the right of the benefits distribution (as in Panel A of Figure 2), since we are 
seeing marginal increases in costs not leading to improvements in health benefits. Still, it 
is possible that some costly procedures provide other non-health benefits (e.g., pain re-
lief) that are lost in these large-scale observational studies, which focus on observable 
mortality and morbidity statistics.94 
CONCLUSIONS 
Since we have not yet resolved the profoundly difficult questions about rationing 
that Elhauge identified twenty years ago, we remain stuck in the absolutist imperative to 
provide patients with access to expensive medical technologies that may have little or no 
real benefits. Instead of using such overt binary rationing mechanisms, however, we can 
adopt, as a matter of regulatory policy and insurance design, a generalized presumption 
against healthcare consumption, at least in the domain of the most expensive outliers. 
The dozen considerations limned herein make it seem unlikely that the benefits of the 
most expensive medical technologies will usually exceed their costs. Policymakers can 
use incentives, nudges, and other policies to discourage consumption of, even while pre-
serving choice and access to, these technologies. Such defeasible policies thereby remain 
open to the inevitable counter-examples of expensive treatments that are highly benefi-
cial, when proponents can meet that burden of particularized persuasion.95 
The foregoing considerations have mostly focused on the question of whether 
spending on expensive medical technologies is likely to produce enough health to justify 
their costs. But of course health is not our only goal, and medical technologies are not 
the only means to that end. As Professor Elhauge explains: “[W]e could accept the prop-
osition that the greatest good in life is health, but still conclude that purchasing more 
health care is less effective than funding nutritious food, safe housing, environmental 
protection, college tuition, or even simply distributing cash.”96 Yet, the United States 
now spends more on health care than on food, housing, transportation, or anything else.97 
Such a flexible regulatory presumption against consumption of expensive medical tech-
nologies will create opportunities for other spending that is likely to enhance patient out-
comes and promote social welfare.	  	  
                                                	   94.	  	   See	  e.g.,	  Amy	  Finkelstein	  et	  al.,	  The	  Oregon	  Health	   Insurance	  Experiment:	  Evidence	   from	  the	  First	  
Year,	   127	   Q.	   J.	   ECON.	   1057,	   1058-­‐62	   (2012)	   (showing	   that	   recipients	   of	   Medicaid	   coverage	   had	   self-­‐reported	  improvements	  in	  well-­‐being).	  	  	  	  95.	  See	  e.g.,	  David	  M.	  Cutler	  &	  Mark	  McClellan,	  Is	  Technological	  Change	  in	  Medicine	  Worth	  It?,	  20	  HEALTH	  AFFS.	  11,	  11	  (2001)	  (finding	  that	  for	  four	  conditions:	  “heart	  attacks,	  low-­‐birthweight	  infants,	  depression,	  and	  cataracts—the	  estimated	  benefit	  of	  technological	  change	  is	  much	  greater	  than	  the	  cost.”).	  	   96.	  	   Elhauge,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  1461-­‐62.	  
 97.  Jost,	  supra	  note	  73,	  at	  537.	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